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Will the Stork Return to Europe and
Japan? Understanding Fertility within
Developed Nations
James Feyrer, Bruce Sacerdote, and
Ariel Dora Stern

T

he last 30 years have witnessed a social change unprecedented in human
history: a variety of high-income nations have experienced fertility declines so large that these countries are far below replacement-level fertility.
Total fertility rates in 2005 are as low as 1.3 children per woman in Italy, Spain,
Germany, and Japan (according to 具http://unstats.un.org/典). Within the highincome countries of the world, no countries are solidly above the fertility rate of
2.1 children per women that is needed to replace the population at a constant level,
with only the United States, New Zealand, Ireland, Iceland, and France above
1.9 children per woman. Absent any change in immigration policy, populations in
Italy, Spain, and Germany will all be declining within the next two decades. Japan’s
population began declining in 2005 and will continue to fall for the indefinite
future. While other cultures have had brief episodes of less-than-replacement-level
fertility, this is the first time in recorded history that large populations with high
and growing per capita income have failed to reproduce themselves over an
extended period of time.
This phenomenon is unlikely to be restricted to the currently high-income
countries. Fertility rates in the majority of developing countries are rapidly moving
toward levels below replacement. If recent evidence from Asia offers any indication,
developing countries may be on a trajectory toward lower long-run fertility than
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high-income countries. Korea, Singapore, and Hong Kong all have estimated total
fertility rates below 1.5 children per women in 2005, compared to values in the
range of 3.5 to 6.0 children per woman in 1970. Chinese total fertility rates are near
replacement levels nationally and substantially below replacement levels in urban
areas. Hong Kong has the lowest fertility rate in the world at 1.0 child per woman.
India’s current fertility rate of about 3.2 children per women is above replacement
rate, but represents a substantial decline from the 4.5 children per woman rate of
20 years ago.
As fertility rates around the world rapidly converge towards the fertility rates of
the high-income nations, it seems useful to investigate why some why some highincome nations have birth rates near replacement level while others are substantially below. We consider a variety of possible theories to explain the differences in
fertility rates across high-income countries. Our particular focus is on how increases
in women’s status over time affect fertility.
Our underlying assumption is that certain forces that are exogenous with
regards to fertility are increasing the opportunities of women in the workforce. One
mechanism may be technological change that favors human capital over physical
labor (Galor and Weil, 1996). Assuming that women are at a comparative disadvantage in physical labor, this gradual change will tend to increase relative wages for
women over time. This increase in women’s labor force opportunities interacts with
preexisting social attitudes about the relative status of women at home.
We assume that technological trends are increasing labor market opportunities everywhere, but that predetermined social differences will generate heterogeneity in the timing of changes in female status on a country-by-country basis. In
particular, we are interested in the interaction between the increasing status of
women in the workforce and their status in the household, particularly with regards
to child care and home production. The latter may be more affected by longstanding societal attitudes than the former.
We observe three distinct phases in women’s status generated by the gradual
increase in women’s workforce opportunities. In the earliest phase, characteristic of
the 1950s and 1960s in the United States, women earn low wages relative to men
and are expected to shoulder all of the child care at home. As a result, most women
specialize in home production and raising children.
In an intermediate category, women have improved (but not equal) labor
market opportunities but their household status lags. Women in this stage are still
expected to do the majority of child care and household production. Increasing
access to market work increases the opportunity cost of having children and fertility
falls. Female labor force participation increases. Working women in this phase of
development have the strongest disincentives to having additional children since
the entire burden of child care falls on them.
In the final phase of development, women’s labor market opportunities begin
to equal those of men. In addition, the increased household bargaining power that
comes from more equal wages results in much higher (if not gender-equal) male
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participation in household production.1 Female labor force participation is higher
than in the intermediate phase. The increased participation of men in the household also reduces the disincentives for women to have additional children, and
fertility rates rise compared to the intermediate phase.
The intermediate, low-fertility phase might describe Japan, Italy, and Spain in
the present day. Labor market opportunities for women in these countries (as
proxied by participation rates) are somewhat lower than the other high-income
countries, but more importantly, the participation of men in household production
is much lower in these countries.
The Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and the modern-day United
States may be entering the final phase. Male participation in household production
is relatively high (and rising) in these countries, and fertility has risen modestly over
the last decade or so despite continued increases in female participation rates.
This framework can explain at least two key facts in the data: First, high-income
countries such as Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan, where men do the smallest
fraction of the household chores and child care (as detailed in the next section),
are also the high-income countries with the lowest fertility rates. Second, within
the high-income countries, the cross-country relationship between fertility and
labor force participation has changed markedly over the last 40 years. In the 1960s
and even 1970s, fertility rates and labor force participation rates were negatively
correlated across countries. In the most recent data, the two rates are positively
correlated.
We think that causality is running from changes in female status to fertility, not
the other way around. The heterogeneity in women’s status is generated by two
factors. First, changes in the nature of work are raising the relative wages of women
in the workforce over time. These changes are a byproduct of human-capitalaugmenting technological change and are therefore exogenous with regards to
fertility. Second, heterogeneity between countries is driven by longstanding cultural differences which move more slowly than fertility rates. In the long run,
cultural attitudes are being driven by common fundamental economic forces, but
in the short run, cultural differences generate timing differences.
Therefore, the increase in women’s status may eventually reverse fertility
trends in Europe and Japan. In particular, men in all high-income countries appear
to be taking on a larger share of household duties, which could lead to a large
positive increase in fertility.
We also explore various possible market causes of differences in fertility across
time and across developed countries, namely population density and housing
prices, but find little evidence that these factors matter much. We do find that
policies that reduce the burden of caring for children make a difference. Government spending on family support and publicly provided day-care services is posi-

1

It is also reasonable to think that social attitudes move more slowly than the labor market in
recognizing the changing role of women.
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tively correlated with fertility. This result is consistent with the notion that reducing
the household cost of having children increases fertility.
However, given the large cost of raising a child in wealthy, modern societies, it
is somewhat hard to believe that the current subsidy levels can make a significant
impact. Peer effects may play an important role. Because many people imitate their
friends, siblings, and parents in choosing their number of children (Fernandez and
Fogli, 2006), policies or exogenous shocks that have modest effects on fertility at
the individual level may have very large impacts at the macro level thanks to peer
effects. This social multiplier could work through a variety of mechanisms in
addition to simple imitation. Societies with larger numbers of children may develop
more family-friendly infrastructure. Businesses in high fertility countries may cater
more to families. This hypothesis also implies that when the pendulum in Italy,
Japan, Germany, and Spain swings back towards higher fertility, it may swing far
enough that these countries could have a baby boom in later decades.

Birth Rate Trends and Patterns
Our analysis will make repeated use of some key conceptual terms: birth rate,
total fertility rate, and completed fertility rate. A birth rate is the number of children
born to a group of women in a given year divided by the group size.
To calculate a total fertility rate for a given year, one first calculates birth rates
by age for all women of child-bearing age (for example, ages 15– 45). The total
fertility rate is the sum of these birthrates by age. Conceptually the total fertility rate
is the number of children a woman entering her child-bearing years would expect
to have if the expected number of births during each year of her life were equal to
the current age-specific birth rates being experienced by women of child-bearing
ages in the current year. A total fertility rate of 2.1 births per woman is estimated
to be the rate at which the population of developed nations will replace itself; the
replacement rate is slightly above 2.0 children per woman because of infant and
child mortality.
Completed fertility rates are a simpler concept: one computes the number of
births per woman for women who have completed their child-bearing years. For
example, in Spain completed fertility for women born in 1940 is equal to 2.9
compared to 1.6 for women born in 1963. In our calculations, completed fertility
for both cohorts excludes births to women 45 and older, though the number of
such births is small relative to the mean. Completed fertility rates reveal the actual
experience for an identifiable group of women. But completed fertility rates by
definition ignore available information on fertility for women who are currently in
their child-bearing years. Total fertility rates have the disadvantage of summing
across different cohorts of women who may have different age-specific fertility rates,
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Figure 1
Total Fertility Rates over Time
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Source: Data are from the United Nations and are available at 具http://unstats.un.org/unsd/default.htm典.

but have the advantage of incorporating the most recent information on birth rates
for women of child-bearing age in the population.2
Figure 1 shows total fertility rates over time for the United States, France,
Germany, Italy, and Japan. The United States in 1955 has a total fertility rate of
about 3.5 births per woman. This rate falls quite rapidly throughout the 1960s and
1970s and flattens out in the 1980s at roughly 1.8 births per woman. Total fertility
then rises modestly during the 1990s and reaches roughly replacement level by
1995.
Total fertility in France is 2.7 births per woman in 1955 and declines steadily
until 1995 to 1.7. At this point, the trend reverses and total fertility climbs to
1.9 births per woman. What is behind the increase in fertility in France? While
definitive causal statements are impossible, it is widely believed that the French
government was able to engineer increased fertility by offering a combination of
more generous tax incentives to families with children, more generous maternity
leave, and several forms of subsidized day care (Moore, 2006). Gatenio-Gabel and
Kamerman (2006) calculate that annual federal subsidies per child in France rose
from $1,793 per child in 1980 to $3,056 per child in 2000 (calculated in 1995
purchasing power parity dollars). These incentives, working together with a social
2

Because total fertility rates are an average over many cohorts, these rates are known to be biased
downward if there is a trend toward fertility occurring later in a woman’s life. However, the low fertility
rates in the high-income countries are sufficiently persistent that the observed changes cannot be
explained by timing effects.
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multiplier effect (Maurin and Moschion, 2006), may explain some of the increase
in French fertility.
In contrast to the French experience, total fertility in Japan, Italy, and Germany has continued to decline and in 2005 was down to 1.3 children per woman.
Italy decreased its federal subsidies per child from 1980 to 2000, while Germany
increased subsidies per child 67 percent to $2,216 (Gatenio-Gabel and Kamerman,
2006).
Convergence in Fertility Rates
The most striking fact about fertility rates across countries is the degree of
absolute convergence. Regardless of income levels or income growth, countries
around the world appear to be heading toward a total fertility rate of something less
than 2 children per woman. We show this graphically in Figure 2, using United
Nations data on total fertility in 1970 and 2000 for 110 countries. The x-axis is the
total fertility rate in 1970 and the y-axis is the change from 1970 to 2000. Almost
every country saw a decrease in total fertility during the 30-year period, and
these decreases were linearly related to the initial level. Countries that had 1970
total fertility rates of 4 –5 children per woman had decreases on the order of
2–3 children per woman over the subsequent 30 years (for example, Cuba, Chile,
and Fiji). Countries with 1970 fertility in the range of 3– 4 children per woman had
decreases on the order of 1 to 2.2 children per woman over the same period (for
example, China, Portugal, Romania, and New Zealand). The countries in the upper
right of Figure 2 are countries that had small fertility decreases given their initial
level. Countries in sub-Saharan Africa are overrepresented in this group. Though
there is a clear negative relationship between income and fertility levels (the
correlation in the cross-section is – 0.65), convergence in fertility rates has occurred
despite a lack of convergence in income per capita. The initial level of fertility is by
far the most important right-hand-side variable in any attempt to understand
changes in fertility rates across the full set of countries for which we have data.3
Extensive Versus Intensive Margins
How much of the long-run decrease in fertility has come from fewer women
having any children (the extensive margin) versus the number of children per
woman among those that have any (the intensive margin)? Both margins are
important and the answer varies country by country. We compared completed
fertility rates for 15 high-income countries for women born in 1940 and women
born in 1963. (The latter group is the youngest cohort of women for which we can
reliably estimate completed fertility since they are 44 years old in 2007.) For each
country, we decomposed the total change in completed fertility into the portion
attributable to the change in the number of women having any children and the

3

For more details on convergence in fertility rates across countries, see Appendix Table A1, available
with this paper at 具http://www.e-jep.org典.
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Figure 2
Convergence in Fertility at the Country Level: Change in Total Fertility 1970 –2000
versus Initial Level
COG
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portion attributable to the change in children per women conditional on having
children.4
At one extreme, Ireland saw a drop in total fertility of 1.37 births per woman
from the 1940 cohort to the 1963 cohort. The bulk of the change in Ireland (0.99
of the 1.37) was attributable to the intensive margin and the rest was attributable to
fewer women having children at all. In contrast, Germany had a drop of 0.59 births
per woman, and this was nearly all due to the extensive margin. In 10 of the 14
countries we considered (Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, France, Netherlands,
Italy, Iceland, Norway, and Denmark), the intensive change in fertility was greater
than the extensive; in the other four countries (West Germany, United Kingdom,
Finland, and Sweden) the extensive margin was larger. Perhaps not surprisingly,
the intensive margin plays a larger role for the countries with the largest decreases
in completed fertility over the period: Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.
4

For a detailed breakdown of these figures by country, see Appendix Table A2, available with this paper
at 具http://www.e-jep.org典. Completed fertility rates are calculated from birth records data available from
Eurostat at 具http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu典. We ignore births to women 45 and older in this table in
order to estimate completed fertility for the most recent cohort possible.
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Determinants of Fertility: Men’s Work at Home, Women’s Market
Work, and Childcare Subsidies
The twentieth-century decrease in fertility in high-income countries is commonly associated with five major factors: 1) increases in the demand for human
capital (Galor and Weil, 2000), which increased the desire of parents to produce
high-human-capital children; 2) increases in income which increased the opportunity cost of men’s and women’s time (Becker, 1981); 3) the long-run increase in
women’s labor force participation (Mira and Ahn, 2002; Brewster and Rindfuss,
2000); 4) declines in childhood mortality; and 5) the availability of easy-to-use and
effective contraception for women (Goldin and Katz, 2000, 2002).5 However, we
argue that the changes brought about by the pill or associated with the first waves
of women entering the work force en masse had largely played themselves out by
the 1990s, and so these factors do little to explain the substantial cross-sectional
differences in fertility across the high-income countries in the early twenty-first
century.
Female Labor Force Participation and Fertility Rates
Higher female labor force participation is generally associated with lower
fertility. For illustration, Figure 3 plots female labor force participation versus total
fertility rates for 83 countries in 1995. The relationship is highly significant. A
ten-percentage-point increase in female labor force participation is associated with
0.45 fewer children per women. This slope has been relatively constant over time in
the large sample.
However, the same relationship for high-income countries has shifted over
time (see also Mira and Ahn, 2002). In 1970, high-income countries with low
female labor force participation were also the ones with high fertility. The coefficient on this relationship in the 1970 sample is not significantly different than in
the 83-country sample in Figure 3. However, among high-income countries, this
negative coefficient moves toward zero and becomes significantly different than the
larger sample by 1980. By 1990, the coefficient in high-income countries between
female labor force participation and fertility is not significantly different from zero.
By 2000, the high-income country relationship between fertility and female participation is upward-sloping.6 Figure 4 shows the relationship between female participation rates and fertility rates in high-income countries for 1995, the last year with

5

Galor (2005) argues from both empirical and theoretical grounds that the demand for human capital
is a more plausible explanation for the demographic transition than a pure income effect or a childhood
mortality effect. The association between women’s labor force participation and fertility could work
through an increase in the opportunity cost of women’s time relative to men’s if the gender gap is
narrowing at the same time that women are entering the workforce (Galor and Weil, 1996).
6
The relationship between fertility and female labor force participation for each of 1970, 1980, 1990,
and 2000 is shown graphically in Appendix Figure A1, available on-line with this paper at 具http://www.
e-jep.org典.
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Figure 3
Total Fertility versus Female Labor Force Participation in 1995
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complete data. The slope is 1.3 and is significant at the 5 percent level. Ireland is
an obvious outlier. Dropping Ireland from the sample increases the slope to 2.0
with a significance level of 0.5 percent; in other words, a 10 percent increase in
female labor force participation is associated with an increase in total fertility of
0.20 births per woman.
The underlying process here is that female labor force participation is rising
in all high-income countries from one decade to the next. The coincident changes
in fertility suggest that the relationship between fertility and female labor force
participation is U-shaped over time and that we just observe different pieces of
the function in each decade. Below female labor force participation rates of
50 – 60 percent, there is a steep negative relationship between female labor force
participation and fertility. Above 50 – 60 percent labor force participation for
women, fertility rises modestly with additional female labor force participation.7
By the year 2000, women in countries like Denmark, Iceland, and Canada
faced relatively attractive conditions both in the labor market and in child-raising,

7

The direct effect of women entering the workforce (which means facing an increased opportunity cost
of their time relative to the increase for men) on fertility may be negative, but the total effect across
countries is positive when we consider that areas with higher status for women in the workplace also offer
higher status for women in the household.
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Figure 4
Total Fertility versus Female Labor Force Participation in High-Income Countries,
1995
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and thus they supplied more market labor and more children relative to women in
Japan and Italy. As Apps and Rees (2004) note, within Europe the countries with
the lowest fertility are among those with the lowest rates of female labor force
participation.
Male Partners and Child Care
Our hypothesis is that social attitudes towards women, both in the labor force
and with regard to child-rearing, are affecting both labor force participation and
fertility rates. Once the labor force is freely open to women, cross-country differences in fertility are driven both by social norms (specifically how much of the
child-rearing burden falls on the mother) and by societal priorities as expressed by
the amount of federal and state subsidies that governments provide to assist families
and to encourage natality. The variables most positively correlated with fertility
rates across the high-income countries appear to be: 1) the share of child care
performed by male partners; and 2) the size of federal subsidies for day care. In
other words, the more help women receive in raising young children, the more
children they are willing to produce.
Low-fertility countries like Italy and Japan are also the ones in which men
contribute the least in terms of child care relative to their spouses and partners.

James Feyrer, Bruce Sacerdote, and Ariel Dora Stern

13

This pattern appears in a variety of datasets using several different measures of
men’s effort in child rearing or attitudes about the appropriate division of labor
between mothers and fathers. Our results confirm those of De Laat and Sevilla Sanz
(2006), who also use the International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data. Fernandez and Sevilla Sanz (2006) show with time use data that in Spain even women who
earn more than their husbands perform a disproportionate share of the child care.
Clearly, one needs to acknowledge the potential endogeneity of male production of
child care and the possibility of reverse causality. Changes in fertility may cause
changes in attitudes or in male child care. In our view, two basic forces drive these
societal changes in attitudes. First, labor markets are evolving in female-friendly
directions in all counties around the world. For example, Galor and Weil (1996)
argue that technological change has raised the relative market wages of women
over time. This trend leads to increasing female participation rates over time. This
change is related to the basic nature of work in technologically advanced societies
and is exogenous with respect to fertility. The second factor generating heterogeneity in outcomes is longstanding attitudinal differences across countries.8 These
differing attitudes generate the observed variation in fertility across the highincome countries in Europe and North America.
Figure 5 shows the share of “housework and caring for sick children” that is
done by men (as assessed by the female partner) on the horizontal axis and the
total fertility rate for the country on the vertical axis. Data on men’s share of
housework/child care is available in the 1994 International Social Survey Program.
Because we are seeking to focus on the share of housework/child care done by
fathers as assessed by mothers, we limit the sample in each country to women with
children under age five. At the country level, the “housework and caring for sick
children” variable has a mean of 0.235 and a standard deviation of 0.041. The high
fertility countries in this group—the United States, New Zealand, Denmark, and
Norway—are also the ones with the most equal division of labor between genders
when it comes to housework/child care.9
One could also use time use data to measure how equally childcare responsibilities are divided between men and women. Guryan, Hurst, and Kearney (in this
symposium) examine time spent performing child care by gender, across countries.
The pattern they see across countries is broadly consistent with the ISSP measure
we use. For example, their data imply that men in the United States spend about
48 percent as much time doing child care as women. In contrast, men in Germany

8

Time use data and participation rate data suggest that attitudes toward women are highly correlated
over time within counties. Female participation rate rankings among the rich countries are relatively
static between 1970 and 2000.
9
The microlevel relationship between men’s percent of the housework/child care and family size goes
consistently in the opposite direction: families in which the man does only a small fraction of the
housework/child care are on average larger families. We interpret this pattern as reflecting sorting into
family types—for instance, families where men are working and women are staying home with many
children would contribute to this pattern.
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Total fertility rate in 2000 (children per woman)

Figure 5
Total Fertility Rate versus Share of Housework/Child Care Done by Men in 2000
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spend about 37 percent as much time as women doing child care; the same number
for Italy is 39 percent.
In Table 1, we further investigate the connection between men’s housework/
child care and fertility. Column 1 of the table shows the regression coefficient from
Figure 5. The coefficient on men’s share of the housework/child care is 4.2, which
implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in men’s share of housework/child
care is associated with an increase in the fertility rate of 0.17 children. In the second
column, we use as the independent variable the female labor force participation
rate in the 30 –35 age group. The coefficient is positive but not significant.
In the third column, we use per-child government spending on families as the
independent variable. For these data, we use the OECD Social Expenditure
(SOCX) 2007 database, which measures governmental social spending on a variety
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Table 1
Total Fertility Rate versus Male Housework/Childcare, Female Labor Force
Participation Rate, and Federal Government Spending on Children

Male housework/child care

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Total fertility
rate 2002

Total fertility
rate 2002

Total fertility
rate 2002

Total fertility
rate 2002

0.146
(0.082)*
0.511
(0.634)
17
0.176

5.23
(2.207)**
⫺0.725
(0.726)
0.046
(0.106)
⫺0.199
(0.643)
17
0.425

4.182
(1.431)***

Female labor force participation
rate, ages 30–35
ln(spending per child)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.659
(0.564)

0.025
(0.558)
18
0.348

1.148
(0.433)**
18
0.079

Sources: Total fertility rate is from United Nations data. “Spending per child” is the federal government’s
family spending per child and is calculated from data at the OECD Social Expenditure Database. Female
labor force participation is from the OECD. The male housework and childcare variable is from the 2002
waves of the International Social Survey Program.
Notes: We limit the sample to women with children in the household. The relevant question asks what
portion of the housework and caring for sick children is done by their spouse or male partner. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

of topics.10 We use federal government spending on families, which includes both
cash benefits, such as family allowances and payments for maternity leave, and also
in-kind benefits, including childcare subsidies or state-provided child care. We
convert these data from percent of GDP to dollars per child in year 2000 (purchasing power parity) dollars. We use the log of spending per child under 15 as our
right-hand-side variable. Column 3 of Table 1 shows that in a regression where log
spending per child is the only regressor, a doubling of spending is associated with
an increase in the fertility rate of 0.15 children, which is marginally significant, at
the 10 percent level. This coefficient is consistent with the results of numerous
(much more detailed) studies which find that pro-natalist policies work. For
example, Björklund (2006) finds that large increases in family spending in Sweden
during 1960 –1980 raised completed fertility rates by 0.4 children per women
relative to other Scandanavian countries. Milligen (2005) finds that the elasticity of
child subsidies to fertility rates in Quebec data is 0.107. In other words; in the long
run, a doubling of subsidies (a 100 percent increase) leads to a 10.7 percent
increase in birthrates, and hence total fertility rises by about 0.21 children. Whittington, Alm, and Peters (1990) estimate a 12 to 24 percent increase in the
This is available at 具http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,3343,en_2649_34819_38141385_1_1_1_
1,00.html典.
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birthrate from a doubling of the personal exemption in the U.S. tax code, which
corresponds to a 0.24 to 0.48 child increase in the total fertility rate. For similar
results, see Sundström and Stafford (1992) for Sweden and McNown and Ridaocano (2004) for Canada.
When all three regressors are included (column 4 of Table 1), the share of
housework/child care done by men is more correlated with fertility than is female
labor force participation or family spending. Family spending and share of male
housework/child care are, however, very highly correlated with each other. Societies that are more effective at sharing the burden of children across the genders
also tend to be more generous in supporting children in the public sphere.11
We also investigated possible connections between fertility rates and societal
attitudes towards fathers performing child care and towards working mothers,
using data from the World Values Survey. For example, we ran a regression with
countries’ total fertility rates as the dependent variable and as the explanatory
variable, the share of adults (men and women) who strongly agreed with the
statement that “fathers are as suited as mothers for childcare.” We found a large
and statistically significant relationship with fertility: a one-standard-deviation increase in the percent of people in a country who agreed with that statement is
associated with a 0.13 child increase in total fertility. Similarly, we ran a regression
with the total fertility rate as the dependent variable and, as the explanatory
variable, the percent of people in a country who agreed or strongly agreed with the
statement that “a working mother can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.” A one-standard-deviation
increase in the percent of respondents who agreed with that statement is associated
with a .17 increase in the total fertility rate. This coefficient is statistically significant
at the 5 percent level.
Types of Government Family Subsidies and Fertility
In Table 2, we use the same OECD data to look more deeply at the effects of
various forms of government family subsidies on fertility. We have data on the
number of legally required weeks of paid maternity and paternity leave, as well as
various forms of family-related spending by the government as a percentage of
GDP. Column 1 regresses the total fertility rate on federally mandated full-time
equivalent paid weeks of maternity and paternity leave. An additional week of
paid paternity leave is associated with a relatively small increase in total fertility of
0.03 children. The coefficient on weeks of maternity leave is negative and statistically significant in the “wrong” direction, although the effect is small. This finding
may reflect the endogeneity of pro-child policies (countries with low fertility may
respond by increasing maternity leave). The correlation between maternity and
paternity leave is surprisingly small, but the general results are robust to including
these coefficients separately.

11

We ran similar regressions using data from the 1994 wave of the ISSP and found similar results.
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Table 2
Total Fertility Rate versus Family Leave and Various Forms of Government
Spending on Families

Federally mandated paid maternity
leave (full-time equivalent weeks)
Federally mandated paid paternity
leave (full-time equivalent weeks)
Federal family spending
(as a percent of GDP)
Cash subsidies
(as a percent of GDP)
Federally provided family services
(as a percent of GDP)
Tax subsidies to families
(as a percent of GDP)
Publicly provided preschool education
(as a percent of GDP)
Publicly provided day care
(percent of GDP)
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Total fertility
rate 2000

Total fertility
rate 2000

Total fertility
rate 2000

Total fertility
rate 2000

⫺0.024
(0.007)***
0.030
(0.015)*
0.122
(0.046)**
0.114
(0.061)*
0.137
(0.086)
0.122
(0.174)

1.865
(0.099)***
23
0.404

1.324
(0.125)***
23
0.254

1.322
(0.135)***
23
0.256

⫺0.129
(0.370)
0.367
(0.180)*
1.552
(0.130)***
22
0.203

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

In column 2, we switch to examining the effects of government spending
on families on fertility. A one-percentage-point increase in spending as a percent
of GDP (which would be roughly equal to doubling the level of spending at the
mean, or an increase of two standard deviations) is associated with an increase of
0.12 children per woman. In column 3, we experiment with separating government
spending on families into cash subsidies, federally provided services, and tax
subsidies. The coefficients on all three categories are similar and only the coefficient on cash subsidies is marginally significant. All three forms of pro-family
government spending appear to be associated with higher fertility, but we can’t
distinguish among their effects.
In column 4, we separate from the “services” category publicly provided
preschool and day care. “Publicly provided day care” has the largest coefficient
(0.37) relative to the other categories, although this variable is significant only at
the 10 percent level. A doubling of spending on day care (from 0.37 percent of
GDP to 0.74) is associated with 0.13 more children per woman. We take this as some
evidence that publicly provided day care may be an effective pro-natalist policy.
This finding is consistent with Blau and Robins (1989) and with Del Boca (2002),
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who finds large effects on fertility in Italy from increasing the availability of free day
care for young children.
It may seem counterintuitive that modest levels of effort by men around the
house, federal subsidies of a few thousand dollars per year, or even free day care
can have a large effect on fertility, given that the time-related costs of raising a child
remain very large. The financial costs of raising a child may be on the order of
$11,600 per year (Lino, 2006). It may be that intuition is misguided here, and
individuals’ fertility decisions are in fact very elastic with respect to cash subsidies
and low-cost day care. However, there may also be peer effects or “social multipliers” in couples’ choices about number of children. It seems likely that people use
their friends, family, and neighbors as a cue to decide how many children to have.
For example, Fernandez and Fogli (2005) offer evidence on cultural effects on
fertility, and Maurin and Moschion (2006) present evidence on neighborhood
effects. The post–World War II baby boom in the United States was far larger than
would be justified by catching-up delayed fertility. Indeed, many of the cohorts of
women who contributed to the baby boom were not even of child-bearing age
during World War II.
In short, social attitudes and norms and subsidies to families, and day care in
particular, play an important role in determining levels of fertility and appear to
have enough influence to push developed countries above or below replacementlevel fertility.12 These norms directly affect the opportunity costs that women face
when they choose to have children, on both the extensive and intensive margins.
Housing as an Equilibrating Mechanism for Fertility
One additional hypothesis sometimes suggested to explain differences in
fertility across the high-income countries is that exogenous differences in housing
costs might be driving different preferences for family size. After all, land is
comparatively plentiful in the United States, and median housing sizes are much
bigger in the United States than in Italy or Spain. The hypothesis that housing costs
affect fertility also suggests an equilibrating mechanism for fertility. For example,
low fertility could reduce the demand for housing, making housing less expensive
and thus encouraging greater fertility.
However, using country-level data or regional data within the United States,
there is no evidence that housing prices have been a major driver of fertility. For
the high-income countries as a whole, looking at housing cost data obtained from
the OECD, neither levels nor changes in housing prices seem correlated with
fertility rates. For regions within the United States, we calculate state-level total

12

For example, a doubling of government spending on families is associated with an increase in the total
fertility rate of 0.13 child, and a one-standard-deviation increase in the fraction of household work done
by men is associated with an increase in the total fertility rate of 0.21 child. Combining these effects
would be enough to move France, Norway, or the United Kingdom from below replacement rate fertility
to above. However, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Japan had total fertility rates of 1.3 in 2005 and thus
would not be moved above replacement rate fertility in this calculation.
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fertility from the 1980 and 2000 Censuses using the Individual Public Use Micro
data, and gathered housing price data from the Office of Federal Housing Oversight’s repeat sales index (available at 具http://www.ofheo.gov/典). If anything, the
U.S. states and metropolitan statistical areas that have seen the largest increases in
housing prices have also seen the largest relative increases in total fertility.
One can certainly argue that either the endogeneity of house prices and
population or omitted variables (like income) make these correlations (or the lack
of such correlations impossible to interpret. We suspect that the positive correlation
between house price changes and fertility changes across U.S. states is partly driven
by convergence in fertility rates across the states. The rural high fertility states in the
Midwest (North Dakota), far West (Wyoming, Alaska), and South (Oklahoma) have
seen rapid convergence towards the lower fertility levels of the Northeast and West
Coast. Meanwhile the Northeast and California have had modest increases in
fertility. However, the large increases in housing costs on the West Coast and in the
Northeast likely have little to do with birth rates.

Will the Fertility Trend in Europe and Japan Reverse?
The arguments of this paper suggest that, for a variety of reasons, high-income
countries with the lowest fertility rates are likely to see an increase in fertility in the
coming decades. If we think of labor force participation rates as a crude index of
women’s status in the labor market, many of the European countries with the lowest
birthrates also have the lowest levels of women’s labor force status. If the labor force
status of women is gradually increasing (and all indications suggest that it is), the
U-shaped relationship between female participation rates and fertility suggests that
we should see modest increases in fertility in these high-income countries over the
coming decades.
Similarly, we have identified two indicators of the degree to which society
shares the child-rearing burden with women: government spending on families
(especially day care) and men’s share of time spent on child care. Both of these
indicators have a steep positive association with fertility and each appears to be
trending upward in European countries. There has been a steady increase in men’s
share of child care throughout the high-income countries during the last 25 years.
Using the Multinational Time Use Survey, we compute the total hours per week of
child care for own children produced by both men and women. We included all
categories of child-related activities such as bathing children, cooking for children,
caring for sick children, reading to children, and so on. We limit the samples to
men and women ages 25–55 with children age five and under in the household. At
the country level, we calculate the fraction of such hours supplied by women.
Figure 6 shows the results for five countries. In the United States, for example,
women were providing roughly 83 percent of the child care in 1975, falling to
62 percent by 2000. The time trend was similar in the United Kingdom, the
Netherlands, Canada, and Norway.
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Woman’s share of total childcare hours

Figure 6
Women’s Share of Total Childcare Hours: Multinational Time Use Survey Data
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Source: Data are from the Multinational Time Use Survey.
Note: We limit the sample to men and women 25–55 who have children under five in the household.
We calculate hours per week spent on child care for men and women, and we average at the country
level to find the proportion of those hours that are reported by women.

In Italy in the 1990s, women were doing about 73 percent of the child
care—about 10 percentage points more than U.S. women at the time. If Italian men
were to increase their fraction of child care to the level of the U.S. men (and if we
take our coefficients in Table 1 to represent a causal relationship), Italy would see
a large 0.5 children per women increase in the total fertility rate. This calculation
is of course speculative. In fact, men doing housework is probably not precisely the
true variable of interest. Rather, it is a marker for how societies view the burden of
raising children. Low-fertility, high-income countries have considerable scope for
greater equality in the allocation of the burdens of child care between men and
women.
Public policy may play a role in raising birth rates as well. In general, government pro-family spending has been trending upward over time. Average government spending on day care in the high-income countries of the OECD has more
than doubled over the last 20 years. France appears to have generated a substantial
increase in fertility in part by doubling child subsidies over the past 20 years. If the
voters in Spain and Italy want to affect the same demographic transformation, it
may be possible in these countries as well.
Fertility rates in the high-income countries of the world appear to be determined by an array of social processes that go beyond the effects of relative wages,
income, and labor force participation. A massive convergence in national fertility
rates is leading to a world that looks very much like the low-fertility European
countries in terms of the number of children per woman. However, in the lowest
fertility European countries the progress of women is limited both in the workforce
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and in the household relative to other high-income countries. We see this as a
temporary state. The social structure in these countries and the division of child
care has led women to choose to have fewer children than did their mothers, but
we see no reason why these social factors cannot also work in the other direction
and lead to future increases in fertility. However, we readily confess that much
remains to be learned about the effects of men’s and women’s allocation of
childcare and household responsibilities and about the effects of pro-family
government subsidies on changes in fertility rates.
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Figure A1
Total Fertility versus Labor Force Participation: 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000
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Table A1
Convergence in Fertility across Countries

Total fertility rate 1970

(1)

(2)

(3)

Total fertility
rate 2000

Total fertility
rate 2000

Total fertility
rate 2000

0.499
(0.057)***

0.531
(0.054)***
1.854
(0.553)***

0.53
(0.082)***
1.853
(0.574)***
⫺0.001
(0.186)
⫺0.544
(1.951)
67
0.61

Female labor force participation rate,
age 30–34, 1970
ln(GDP per capita) 1970
Constant
Observations
R-squared

0.302
(0.277)
67
0.541

⫺0.556
(0.363)
67
0.61

Note: Total fertility rate, labor force participation rate, and GDP per capita data are from the United
Nations database available at 具http://unstats.un.org/典. Standard errors in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A2
Change in Completed Fertility Rate for Cohorts of Women Born 1940 and 1963,
Extensive and Intensive Margins
Change in completed fertility
1940–1963

Country
Ireland
Spain
Portugal
West
Germany
Belgium
United
Kingdom
France
Netherlands
Italy
Iceland
Norway
Denmark
Finland
Sweden

Levels of completed fertility for 1940 and 1963 cohorts

Completed
Completed Completed
fertility
fertility
fertility
rate
Extensive Intensive
rate
rate
Extensive Extensive Intensive Intensive
change
share
share
1940
1963
1940
1963
1940
1963
⫺1.37
⫺1.36
⫺0.81
⫺0.59

⫺0.38
⫺0.21
⫺0.08
⫺0.54

⫺0.99
⫺1.15
⫺0.73
⫺0.05

3.69
2.94
2.58
1.97

2.32
1.58
1.76
1.38

0.95
0.92
0.94
0.89

0.84
0.84
0.91
0.65

3.87
3.19
2.73
2.21

2.76
1.89
1.94
2.14

⫺0.59
⫺0.52

⫺0.28
⫺0.36

⫺0.30
⫺0.16

2.17
2.36

1.58
1.84

0.91
0.89

0.78
0.75

2.38
2.65

2.02
2.45

⫺0.49
⫺0.45
⫺0.39
⫺0.38
⫺0.29
⫺0.22
⫺0.12
⫺0.04

⫺0.17
⫺0.17
⫺0.12
0.26
⫺0.04
⫺0.04
⫺0.17
⫺0.05

⫺0.32
⫺0.28
⫺0.27
⫺0.65
⫺0.25
⫺0.18
0.04
0.01

2.41
2.21
1.91
2.90
2.36
2.10
2.03
1.98

1.92
1.76
1.51
2.52
2.07
1.88
1.91
1.94

0.92
0.88
0.87
0.89
0.91
0.90
0.86
0.87

0.85
0.81
0.81
0.98
0.89
0.88
0.79
0.85

2.64
2.52
2.18
3.25
2.60
2.33
2.37
2.28

2.27
2.19
1.86
2.56
2.33
2.13
2.43
2.29

Note: “Extensive margin” is defined as the percentage of women in the cohort having at least one child.
“Intensive margin” is defined as the average number of children for women with at least one child.
Completed fertility rates are calculated from birth records data available from Eurostat at 具http://
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu典. We take two cohorts of women (those born in 1940 and 1963) and calculate
their completed fertility rates (children per woman). We decompose the change in completed fertility
rate into the portions attributable to the extensive and intensive margins. We make use of the fact that
“completed fertility rate” ⫽ “extensive margin” * “intensive margin.” We take logs and first-difference
this identity to arrive at the decomposition.
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